The Valuation and Hedging of Deferred Commission Asset Backed Securities by Boudoukh, Jacob et al.
The Valuation and Hedging of Deferred Commission
Asset Backed Securities
Jacob Boudoukh
a
, Patrick McAllister
b
,
Matthew Richardson
a
, and Robert F. Whitelaw
c*
April 28, 2000
*a
Stern School of Business, New York University and NBER;
b
Constellation Financial Management;
c
Stern School of Business, New York University. We would like to thank Jamie Alexander and Mark Wolf-
son of Keystone, Inc. and Joe D'Anna of Constellation Financial Management for helpful comments and
suggestions and Joe D'Anna for compiling the information for the case study. Contact: Matthew Richardson,
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190, New York, NY 10012, (212) 998-0349, email: mrichar0@stern.nyu.edu. The
most recent version of this paper can be found at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/rwhitela/research.html
The Valuation and Hedging of Deferred Commission Asset
Backed Securities
Abstract
Due to a timing mismatch between fee receipts and commission payments, there is a new
and growing market for securities backed by fees from back-end load and level load mutual
funds. This paper develops a contingent claims methodology for the valuation of these
securities. The resulting security value depends primarily on the current value of fund assets
and the fee schedule. The valuation formula also provides an analytical expression for the
appropriate strategy for hedging uctuations in asset value. As a case study, we investigate
the hedging performance of an institution that holds a portfolio of these securities.
1 Introduction
The mutual fund industry manages over six trillion dollars of assets. These funds are oered
by a variety of dierent sponsors, many of whom either do not market their product directly
or are not the sole marketers of their product to potential investors. Instead, these mutual
funds rely on brokerage houses to help market and sell their funds. Approximately 14%
of these funds have fees which are either back-end loaded (\B shares") or level loaded (\C
shares"). The B or C shares are structured in such a way that investors tend to pay the
fees to the mutual fund complex at some future date, while the commissions paid to the
brokerage house by the mutual fund are paid immediately.
In order to pay the brokerage commissions, mutual fund complexes have generally taken
out bank loans, that is, on-balance sheet nancing. However, the misalignment of cash
ows exposes the mutual fund to risks, such as changes in the fund's net asset value (NAV)
and/or fund redemptions, that they may not want to bear. As a result, a number of B- and
C-share nancing companies have been created as intermediaries between the mutual fund
industry and the brokerage houses. In essence, these nancing shops front the full expenses
of the back-end and level load commissions in return for a portion of the fees from the B
and C shares. Many of these companies then securitize these fees, issuing claims on them
as a new form of asset backed security, called Deferred Commission Asset Backed Securities
(DCABS).
This paper develops a methodology for the valuation and hedging of these DCABS. While
the method is specic to the contracts underlying the DCABS, in theory the approach can be
applied to the valuation of any institution's holdings of deferred fees, such as a back-end or
level load mutual funds.
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Thus, the applicability of the methodology is widespread. Current
valuation methods involve an analysis of expected future cash ows implied by the mutual
funds fees, which are then discounted back into present value terms. Because these contracts
also involve a number of embedded options, a discounted cash ow (DCF) approach seems
antiquated. In this paper, we employ a contingent claims approach to the valuation and
hedging of DCABS. Under fairly general assumptions about the distribution of the NAVs of
the funds, simple formulas result that make the analysis of DCABS particularly informative.
The key insight underlying our valuation approach is that, in an ecient market, the
present value of a claim on the future value of an asset is simply a function of the current
value of that asset. The result is that the value of the DCABS can be written in terms
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More generally, our analysis sheds light on the valuation and risks of mutual fund companies, as well as
other money management entities within this important nancial services industry.
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of three elements: (1) the current value of assets under management, (2) the volatility of
this value and the risk-free rate for valuing option-like features, and (3) a set of parame-
ters that describe the fund, including the fee schedules, the expense ratio, the dividend and
capital gains distribution rate, the reinvestment rate, and the path of expected future re-
demptions. For reasonable sets of parameters, the primary factors are the asset value and the
fee schedule. We also illustrate the sensitivity of the valuation to the various parameters for
a representative fund. Finally, given the relatively simple valuation equation, it is straight-
forward to derive analytically the appropriate strategy for hedging the risk associated with
uctuations in asset value.
This paper provides several contributions to the current nance literature. First, we
describe a potentially important new asset backed security, DCABS, which covers many of
the fee structures imposed by the six trillion dollar mutual fund industry. Second, and most
important, we provide a new valuation and hedging methodology for DCABS that allows
investors, B- and C-share nancing companies, and mutual funds themselves an improved
way of measuring the returns and risk of their businesses. This methodology is particularly
simple and intuitive, and is rooted in modern nance theory a la Black and Scholes (1973).
Third, as a case study, we investigate the portfolio of DCABS held by one specic nancing
company, Constellation Financial Management, which has chosen, in the past, not to secu-
ritize the fees, but instead to manage them on their balance sheet. This case study allows
us a unique opportunity to evaluate the hedging performance of one institution as it relates
to the various risks associated with DCABS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the mutual fund industry as it
relates to B and C shares and the market for DCABS. In Section 3, we describe the contract
associated with DCABS and the standard approach to valuing these securities in practice. We
develop an alternative contingent claims approach to the valuation and hedging of DCABS
and illustrate the importance of the various assumptions underlying the model. As a case
study, Section 4 describes the portfolio of DCABS of one particular nancial institution,
and investigates its ability to hedge NAV risk and other risks inherent in DCABS. Section 5
makes some concluding remarks.
2 The Mutual Fund Business and DCABS
Over the past decade, the mutual fund industry has experienced exponential growth. To-
tal assets under management have grown from approximately $0.8 trillion to $5.5 trillion,
which represents an annualised growth rate of 20% (see Mutual Fund Development in 1998,
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published by the Investment Company Institute). The majority of these assets are in equity
and bond funds (about 70%), with money market funds and various hybrid products such
as annuities accounting for the remainder. The spectacular growth was driven by both large
cash inows and strong growth in equity markets.
New sales are generated through three channels: (i) direct marketing to institutional
investors and individual investors through 401(k) plans, fee-based advisors and wrap accounts
(which accounts for 17% of sales), (ii) conventional direct marketing to individual investors
(23%), and (iii) indirect marketing through a sales force (the most prevalent method at
60%). This latter category, which accounted for $897 billion of sales in 1998, is conducted
primarily through a network of sales representatives, such as broker-dealers, banks, and
insurance agents.
Mutual funds can be divided broadly into three categories according to their fund fees
structure: (i) no load funds, (ii) front load funds, and (iii) back or at load (deferred load)
funds. Traditionally the industry has been dominated by front load funds. In recent years,
there have been two trends reducing the market share of these funds. First, the fastest grow-
ing segment of the industry is no load index funds, characterized by low, at management
fees (e.g., Vanguard's Index Trust 500). Second, there is a shift within the load fund category
from front load to deferred load funds. One potential reason for this change is that investors
are investing over longer horizons, and for longer holding periods back load funds tend to
be cheaper (on an annualized basis). In addition, with back load funds the full 100% of the
money invested \works for you" until redemption.
Table 1 provides summary information on mutual funds from the Morningstar database.
The total NAV of equity and xed income mutual funds in December 1998 was $3.8 trillion.
Of this amount, 49% was invested in no load funds, and 51% in load funds. There are almost
an equal number of front load and deferred load funds, but since the typical front load fund
is larger, about 70% of the funds invested in load funds are invested in front load funds.
This dierence in fund size is presumably due to the longer history of front load funds, but,
by most accounts, current fund ows are dominated by inows to deferred load funds.
In contrast to no load funds, load funds levy a sales charge or commission which is
assessed to cover selling costs. Shares are classied by the form of the load: front load (\A
shares"), back-end load (\B shares"), or level load (\C shares"). In transactions involving
A shares, the traditional arrangement is that the investor pays a sales charge to the broker
or nancial planner, and this charge is immediately deducted from the investment at the
time it is made. These charges range anywhere from 3% to 8.5%. In contrast, B or C shares
involve fees at later dates; the broker still receives a sales commission, but it comes from the
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mutual fund complex rather than immediately from the investor. As such, the mutual fund
complex needs to nance these commissions.
The most common of these load funds, the class B shares, move the loads from the
time of purchase to the time of redemption, where the load itself gradually diminishes the
longer the shares are held. For example, a typical arrangement might be a 4% load if the
investor sells the shares during the rst year, 3% if sold during the second year or third
year, 2% in the fourth year, and 1% in the fth year. The investor pays no load if the
fund is sold after ve years. In addition to this protection against early redemptions, called
Contingent Deferred Sales Charges (CDSC), the fund recoups its costs over the period by
adding deferred sales charges to the fund's annual expenses, which makes them higher than
they would otherwise be. These charges, called Asset Based Sales Charges (ABSC), fall
under the general class of \12(b)-1" fees, which is a method of charging distribution-related
expenses (such as marketing costs) directly against fund assets. The term \12(b)-1" refers to
the 1980 U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission rule that permits the use of these charges.
Standard practice is that after the CDSC period, the fund organizations will automatically
convert the class B shares to class A shares (which pay lower annual expenses).
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As described above, selling B shares can be expensive for mutual fund companies. These
companies must pay brokers' commissions upfront, and then wait to collect the money back
through the 12b-1 fees (i.e., the ABSCs) and the CDSC revenue streams. The on-balance
sheet nancing of these commissions via bank loans can be troublesome to the mutual fund
complex due to various risk considerations such as the mistiming and risk exposure of the
ABSC and CDSC revenues. As a result, a nancial services industry has emerged that
performs B-share nancing. These nancing companies perform one primary function {
they purchase the future ABSC and CDSC revenue streams from the mutual fund complex
and, in the process, assume the risks that go with the revenue stream. The mutual fund
complex uses these sales to then pay the brokers' commissions, as well as possibly pocket
any remaining proceeds (for their own marketing and sales eorts). The key feature is that
the mutual fund complex avoids all the risks associated with back-end loads.
Of course, the nancing companies now bear the risks. The cash ow streams incorporate
several risks. First, there is a structural risk that the SEC may modify rule 12b-1 either
2
Similar to class B shares, class C shares have no front-end loads; however, their deferred loads are usually
a relatively small proportion of the assets (e.g., 1%) and only apply to redemptions made during the rst
year the investor owns the shares. However, the fund charges a \level load" that is built into a higher overall
annual expense charge and continues for as long as the investor owns the shares. For the remainder of the
paper, we describe the pricing and hedging of securities backed by B shares since they are the most common
of the two loads and C shares can be priced similarly.
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by lowering the 12b-1 payment percentage (currently capped at 1% per year), limiting it's
practical use, or eliminating it entirely. Clearly, these costs are borne by the holders of
the revenue streams. Second, and most important, there is the net asset value (NAV) risk
associated with these streams. Since these streams are asset-based fund expenses, decreases
in NAV due to either interest rate, currency or stock market movements aect the payment
stream. Third, the so-called redemption penalties, i.e., contingent deferred sales charges
(CDSCs), are calculated as the lesser of an investor's original deposit or the current net asset
value minus all reinvested dividend and capital gain distributions. Thus, if redemptions
increase as net asset values decline, the nancing company can potentially lose. Finally,
CDSCs typically end before B shares are converted to A shares. If investors redeem their
holdings after the CDSC period, but before conversion, i.e., before the commissions are fully
recovered, then the nancing companies bear the brunt of the shortfall.
Within a mutal fund complex or money management division, there may be a number
of funds managing a variety of assets. These assets will vary from xed income to equi-
ties to foreign exchange to commodities, and cover domestic or international markets. For
class B-share entities, these funds will generally have a particular ABSC schedule and CDSC
schedule. As assets come into the mutual fund complex, and this complex must pay corre-
sponding commission fees to brokers, B-share nancing companies pay the commissions and
receive the ABSC and CDSC schedule. Specically, the process involves the mutual fund
complex selling pools of cash ows from each of their funds. These pools tend to include
assets under management which were originated at similar dates. In theory, the B-share
nancing company will own a number of pools of revenue streams derived from a particular
fund. Similar pools are then packaged together and sold o to investors as pass-through
securities, i.e., DCABS. Given the value of assets in deferred load funds (see Table 1), the
continuing asset ows into these funds, and the benets in risk-sharing oered by securiti-
zation, it is clear that the potential DCABS market is extremely large.
3 The Valuation and Hedging of DCABS
3.1 The Cash Flows of DCABS
The pools of assets underlying the DCABS will generally face a particular ABSC schedule
and CDSC schedule depending on the fund from which they come. While these schedules
will dier across mutual funds and mutual fund complexes, a typical schedule is presented
in Table 2. In this example, investors pay a fee of 0.75% of their assets under managment
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each year. If investors redeem any shares, they pay a penalty ranging from 4.0% to 0.0%,
depending on the redemption year.
In order to better understand the valuation and hedging of DCABS, let us examine a
representative pool of cash ows that originates at time 0 and matures at time T . Any
particular cash ow during the T -year period is subscripted by t. Thus, let us dene ABSC
t
as the scheduled ABSC at time t (e.g., in year 4, ABSC
t
= 0:75%) and CDSC
t
as the
scheduled CDSC at time t (e.g., in year 4, CDSC
t
= 2:0%). In addition, we will make the
following assumptions:
1. The net asset value (NAV) of the fund follows a lognormal distribution, with mean 
and variance 
2
. (This assumption is necessary for valuing the embedded put option
implicit in the CDSC payments, but not the other cash ow components).
2. The dividend yield (DIV), capital gains yield (CG), expense ratio (EXP) and divi-
dend/capital gains distribution reinvestment rate (RE) of the fund are all constant.
(These parameters generally represent second order eects on the DCABS value, and,
for many funds, this assumption is reasonable.) All the inputs are assumed to be
annualized and in decimal form, e.g., DIV = 0:02 means an annual dividend yield of
2%.
3. The continuously compounded risk-free rate, r
f
, is constant.
4. Redemption rates are stochastic, but independent of the NAV of the fund. We dene
RD
t
as the expected redemption rate as a fraction of outstanding originations at time
t.
This last assumption requires some discussion. Future redemption rates are, of course,
unobservable, but in practice, these rates can be estimated from historical data. If redemp-
tion rates are either nonstochastic or stochastic but independent of the fund's NAV, then we
can simply use the expected redemption rate. However, if redemption rates have a stochas-
tic element which depends on the fund's NAV, then in theory this would induce a nonlinear
payo to DCABS, which would require some model of the joint distribution of NAV and
redemptions, i.e., in eect, a two-factor model.
At rst glance, there are several reasons why redemptions may depend on the fund's NAV.
First, if a fund performs poorly, i.e., low relative NAVs, then one might expect redemptions
to increase. Of course, this theory is based on the assumption that fund managers have
some ability to beat the market (or the investors' perception that they have this ability
or lack thereof). In support of this argument, some recent statistical evidence suggests
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redemptions increase with declines in NAV (see, for example, Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and
Tufano (1998)). However, this evidence is mixed and much weaker for the load funds relevant
for our analysis, particularly the back-end load funds with CDSCs. Second, there may be
tax planning reasons for redeeming the shares when the NAV of the fund has fallen. In this
case, redemptions will behave similarly to the case above. On the other hand, redemptions
are likely to depend not on absolute fund performance, but rather on relative performance,
relative to a benchmark, an index or a designated asset class. If this is the case then, in
keeping with our assumption that there is no superior performance ability (alpha) in these
funds, redemption should depend on a relative performance measure, which is less correlated
with the level of NAV. Hence, we assume that redemptions are stochastic but independent of
NAV, and leave to future research the more complex analysis in which redemptions depend
on the future path of a fund's NAV.
At any period t during the life of the pool underlying the DCABS, dene ORIG
t
as
the originated assets remaining at time t, AUM
t
as the dollar value of the assets under
management at time t, and NAV
t
as the net asset value (i.e., the fund's \share price")
at time t. Note that at origination, the dollar value of assets, the net asset value and
origination dollars are all equal, i.e., AUM
0
= NAV
0
= ORIG
0
. As time passes though,
these values begin to diverge. This divergence is important as the cash ows of DCABS
depend dierentially on all three values. Consider each of these values.
 From time 0 to time t, ORIG
t
equals ORIG
0
adjusted for any redemptions of the
original assets. In particular,
ORIG
t
= ORIG
0
"
t 1
Y
s=0
(1  RD
s
)
#
: (1)
 In contrast, the assets under management, AUM
t
, are expected to grow at their gross
return rate, , each period. However, this growth is mitigated by the fund's expense
ratio, EXP, and by the fact that not all the dividends or capital gains distributions
are reinvested, (1 RE)(DIV+CG). Furthermore, the amount of these assets decline
as redemptions build up. Specically,
AUM
t
= AUM
0
(1 + )
t
(1  )
t
"
t 1
Y
s=0
(1  RD
s
)
#
(2)
where   EXP + (1  RE)(DIV + CG):
 The net asset value at time t, NAV
t
, grows like AUM
t
, except reinvested dividends
and capital gains are not incorporated into the value. Intuitively, NAV is the share
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price of the fund's original assets. In particular, its value grows at the gross return less
expenses and the total dividend and capital gains distributions:
NAV
t
= NAV
0
(1 + )
t
(1  )
t
"
t 1
Y
s=0
(1  RD
s
)
#
(3)
where  = EXP +DIV + CG:
As mentioned above, the holder of the DCABS receives cash ows from two sources. The
rst source is from asset based sales charges (ABSCs), i.e., 12b-1 fees, which represent a
xed percentage of assets under management. These revenues are received monthly until
either redemption takes place (or eventual conversion to \A" shares, usually in eight years
time). With redemptions, the AUM of the fund, and the resulting ABSCs, decline every
month thereafter by the percent of the AUM that is redeemed. In particular, at any point
in time t, the ABSC cash ows are the product of the ABSC schedule and the assets under
management, i.e.,
ABSC
t
AUM
t
: (4)
The second source of revenues comes from redemption penalties as compensation for the
loss of these ABSCs. In particular, if an investor redeems his/her shares within a particular
period of time, the holder of the DCABS is entitled to Contingent Deferred Sales Charges
(CDSCs). These CDSCs take the form of a xed percentage of the redeemed NAV; however,
this xed percentage rate falls the longer the shares are held by the investor. Moreover, as
mentioned previously, the CDSC is paid as a percentage of the minimum of NAV at purchase
or NAV at redemption. Since CDSCs are paid on redemptions on the minimum of origination
value and current NAV, the cash ows are
CDSC
t
RD
t
min(ORIG
t
;NAV
t
):
This cash ow can be decomposed into two components
CDSC
t
RD
t
[ORIG
t
 max(ORIG
t
  NAV
t
; 0)]: (5)
The rst component, CDSC
t
RD
t
ORIG
t
, represents a xed cash ow based on the orig-
inated assets remaining at time t, the CDSC schedule at time t, and the redemptions at
time t. Of course, from above, ORIG
t
is just equal to the initial dollar value of the assets
originated, scaled down by all the redemptions that have taken place prior to that point in
time. The second component represents a put on the fund's net asset value, NAV
t
, with a
strike price equal to ORIG
t
, i.e., the cash ows are identical to the expected payo on a put
CDSC
t
RD
t
E[max(ORIG
t
  NAV
t
; 0)]:
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Recall that NAV grows at the gross return less expenses and the total dividend and capital
gains distributions, i.e., .
3.2 Valuation
The standard approach to valuing DCABS has been a discounted cash ow approach. The
DCF approach to valuation calculates expected cash ows along the lines described above,
that is, in terms of the three components. The next step is to discount these cash ows
back to the current date at the internal rate of return (IRR). The IRR is computed as the
discount rate which equates the discounted expected cash ows to the cost at the purchase
date. Several problems exist with this methodology. First, the three cash ow components
are governed by dierent risks: (i) the ABSCs by the risk of the underlying assets, (ii) the
CDSC component on the original assets by the risk free rate, and (iii) the short position
in the put by the rate appropriate for a put option on the underlying assets. Thus, with
various discount rates, an IRR is dicult to interpret. Second, the risks of these cash
ow components will vary across funds, so that an IRR across funds is also problematic to
analyze. Finally, in terms of risk management of the DCABS, it is unclear whether an IRR
methodology is consistent with the type of risk measurements that are appropriate.
Below, we try to rectify this problem by applying a contingent claims approach to the
pricing and hedging of DCABS. The fundamental idea is to recognize that DCABS represent
a claim on the underlying net asset value of the mutual fund, subject to redemption shocks.
In an ecient market, the present value of claims on the future assets of the fund is just
the current value of the assets.
3
We can therefore apply modern nancial theory to valuing
the DCABS by recognizing that these securities are just contingent claims on the underlying
assets under management, which have observable market values. This approach relies on
the simple insight that the present value of X% of the fund in N years is just X% of the
fund today. That point, coupled with a Black-Scholes European option valuation of the
embedded put option in the CDSCs, makes the valuation straightforward. Consequently,
the three components can be valued today without making assumptions about the expected
returns.
3
Professionals might argue that the expense ratios represent, or perhaps even under-represent, investment
management skills. That is, the present value of the future assets is greater than the current value due to
stock or bond picking abilities, so that the assets are growing at a rate faster than the current market
expected returns. We choose instead to believe the volumes of evidence that suggest that mutual funds do
not earn excess returns, and that the expense ratios are reective of transactions costs, rather than some
managerial skill (see Carhart (1997), and Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavka (1993)).
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At any time between period 0 and T , the value of the DCABS will depend on a number
of variables, including the future ABSC and CDSC schedules, as well as the prior level of
redemptions. Consider valuing the DCABS at a particular point in time t by valuing each
of the three cash ow components separately. The rst cash ow, the ABSC component, is
a claim on the future value of the assets under management. Its value is simply the present
value of the future value of the assets, i.e., the current value. Thus, using equations (2) and
(4), the value can be written as
V
1;t
= AUM
t
"
T
X
=1
ABSC
t+
(1  )

"
 1
Y
s=0
(1  RD
s
)
##
: (6)
The CDSC value reects two components: (i) the present value of all future redemptions
at the CDSC schedule, plus (ii) a downward adjustment for the fact that the CDSC basis
may decline if the NAV of the fund declines, either due to expenses or to a fall in the
underlying value of the assets. The rst CDSC component cash ow is simply the expected
redemptions times the original assets under management at the particular CDSC schedule.
Thus, the appropriate discount rate is the risk-free rate, giving a value of
V
2;t
= ORIG
t
"
T
X
=1
CDSC
t+
RD
t+
[
Q
 1
s=0
(1  RD
s
)]
(1 + r
f
)

#
: (7)
While the investors in DCABS own the xed CDSC component, recall that they have
implicitly written a put option on the fund's NAV, with a strike price equal to the original
asset value. In order to value the put option, note that  is dened on the cum-distribution
value of the assets. To coincide with option pricing theory we need to translate it into an
ex-distribution value as follows
 =

1  
:
We also need the corresponding continuously compounded quantity


= ln(1 + )
Thus, NAV can be viewed as the stock price on a dividend paying stock with dividend .
With the appropriate assumptions about the distribution of NAV , this cash ow can be
valued via the usual Black-Scholes analysis. Specically,
V
3;t
=
"
T
X
=1
CDSC
t+
RD
t+
 1
Y
s=0
(1  RD
s
)
"
ORIG
t
(1 + r
f
)

N( d
2
) 
NAV
t
(1 + )

N( d
1
)
##
(8)
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where
d
1
=
ln(NAV
t
=ORIG
t
) + (r

f
  

+ 0:5

2
)


p

d
2
= d
1
  

p



2
= ln[
2
+ (1 + )
2
]  ln[(1 + )
2
], i.e., the variance of log returns
r

f
 ln(1 + r
f
)
The total value is just the sum of the three components described in equations (6)-(8):
V
t
= V
1;t
+ V
2;t
  V
3;t
: (9)
The determinants of equation (9) are the fee schedules (ABSC and CDSC), the value of the
underlying assets, redemption rates (RD), and fundamental parameters { DIV, CG, EXP,
RE, r
f
and .
The eects of most of these factors on the value of DCABS are clear. Higher ABSC or
CDSC schedules generate higher cash ows and higher values. Higher dividend and capital
gains distributions and higher expenses decrease the value of DCABS. For reinvestment
rates of less than 100%, these factors decrease both expected future ABSCs from AUM and
expected CDSCs from redemptions. Higher reinvestment rates partially oset the eects of
distributions on AUM. A higher risk-free rate reduces the present value of future CDSCs from
redemptions and thus lowers the value of DCABS. Increasing volatility increases the value
of the put option given to investors and thus lowers the value of the DCABS. The eect of
the nal factor, redemptions, is less clear and more interesting. An increase in redemptions
increases contemporaneous revenues from CDSCs, but decreases future revenues from both
ABSCs and CDSCs. The net eect depends on the remaining relative fee schedules, the
speed of future redemptions, and AUM relative to ORIG and NAV.
Table 3 illustrates both the direction and magnitudes of these eects via a sensitivity
analysis for a valuation on a representative fund at origination. The base case value of
$4.82 is based on $100 of assets under management, the parameter values given in the table,
and the fee schedules in Table 2. Note that more than 75% of the value comes from the
ABSC component even though cumulative redemptions reach almost 65% over the life of
the security, primarily because these redemptions tend to increase over time as the CDSC
schedule falls. The put option given to investors accounts for a decrease in value of only
approximately 2.5%.
In general, the eects of the parameters on the value of the security are signicant though
not huge. For example, increasing the combined dividend and capital gains yield from 5%
11
to 10% decreases the total value to $4.67, or by slightly more than 3%.
4
The majority of
this eect comes through the decrease in NAV and the resulting increase in the value of
the redemption put option (V
3
). In contrast, decreasing the reinvestment rate from 90% to
80% only has an eect on the ABSC component (V
1
) via the eect on AUM. Reducing fund
expenses from 2% to 1% increases total value to $4.96, primarily through the positive eect on
future AUM. A large increase in volatility from 15% to 25% signicantly increases the value
of the redemption put option but has a small overall eect (less than 1.5%) on value. Finally,
for these parameters, an increase of 10% in redemptions each year decreases the value of the
security to $4.71. Interestingly, the eects on both the ABSC and CDSC components are
very large, but they almost totally oset due to the nature of the fee schedules. Specically,
while early redemptions dramatically reduce ABSCs, they are penalized heavily via high
CDSCs. The eects across years are not completely uniform, but standard fee schedules are
designed with exactly this issue in mind.
3.3 Hedging
B-share nancing companies create value through being an intermediary between brokerage
houses and mutual funds. In theory, as this market develops, the fees from B shares will fall
as all the risks get transferred to the B-share nancing companies. Of course, these nancing
companies need to manage the risks either on their balance sheets or in the interim period
as they securitize them and sell them to the marketplace. Either way, for these nancing
companies to grow and raise capital for their business, it is necessary to hedge their current
portfolio of DCABS.
In order to calculate their hedge positions, dene
C vector of futures contract costs

AUM;AUM
covariance matrix of fund returns

Fut;Fut
covariance matrix of futures returns

AUM;Fut
covariance matrix of fund returns with futures returns
SPBR shadow price of basis risk
Using the valuation formulas in equations (6)-(8) above, it is possible to calculate analytically
the change in the value of DCABS for a change in the value of the underlying assets:
@V
@AUM
=
@V
1
@AUM
+
@V
2
@AUM
 
@V
3
@AUM
4
Note that the value depends only on the sum of the dividend and capital gains yield. Therefore, the
eect is identical regardless of how the increase in yield is divided between the two components.
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Note that the second component (the xed basis CDSC) is independent of the value of the
assets; therefore, the derivative is zero. For the ABSC component, we get
@V
1;t
@AUM
t
=
"
T
X
=1
ABSC
t+
(1  )

[
 1
Y
s=0
(1  RD
s
)]
#
> 0
For the CDSC put component
@V
3;t
@AUM
t
=
@V
3;t
@NAV
t
=
"
T
X
=1
CDSC
t+
RD
t+
 1
Y
s=0
(1  RD
s
)[(1 + )
 
(N(d
1
)  1)]
#
< 0
An increase in the asset value increases the value of the security, both by increasing expected
future ABSC revenues and by reducing the value of the put owned by the investors. This
latter eect will be small as long as the put is likely to nish out-of-the-money, i.e., when
N(d
1
) is close to 1. The precise magnitude depends on the values of the other parameters,
but Table 3 provides some suggestive evidence. Specically, the last column provides the
price elasticity (i.e., the percentage change in price over the percentage change in AUM) for
each of the scenarios discussed in Section 3.2. The elasticity ranges between 0.82 and 0.94,
suggesting that the value of the security moves strongly with the value of the underlying
assets but not quite one-for-one. This elasticity is particularly sensitive to two factors {
redemptions and yields. High expected redemptions reduce elasticity because they shift
value to the xed CDSC component which does not depend on AUM. In contrast, high
yields (dividend or capital gains yields) increase the value of the redemption put option and
its probability of nishing in the money, hence increasing elasticity.
Given a set of futures contracts with corresponding costs C, the goal of the hedging
exercise is to choose a set of futures positions b to minimize the cost of the residual risk plus
the cost of the futures contracts, i.e.,
min
b
Var()  SPBR + C
0
b
where
 = V   b
0
F
and V and F denote the change in value of the securities and the futures contracts,
respectively. Dene the hedge ratio of each security with respect to the fund assets as
h =
@V
@AUM
AUM:
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Then the residual risk can be written
V ar() = h
0

AUM;AUM
h+ 2h
0

AUM;Fut
b + b
0

Fut;Fut
b
When costs are ignored, the futures positions which minimize the residual risk are
b =  
 1
Fut;Fut

0
AUM;Fut
h;
which are just the coecients from an OLS regression of security returns on futures returns.
When the costs of the futures contracts are taken into account, the solution is more complex
and numerical search procedures may be necessary. However, for the special case in which
all the futures positions are negative, the solution is
b =  
 1
Fut;Fut


0
AUM;Fut
h 
C
SPBR

:
Intuitively, the magnitudes of the futures positions are reduced depending on their costs
relative to the cost of not hedging (i.e., the price of basis risk). If either futures costs are
high or the price of residual risk is low, then positions are reduced more.
4 Constellation Financial Management: A Case Study
In this section we present a case study of Constellation Financial Management, a company
whose main business is purchasing deferred commission assets from mutual fund companies.
5
This analysis illustrates some of the relevant practical and methodological considerations in
the implementation of the theory developed in this paper. Constellation's strategy is to form
a leveraged entity, with DCABS as assets, and bank debt as the largest liability. Given such
a strategy, risk management/hedging takes on paramount importance.
4.1 The Company
Constellation Financial Management Company, L.L.C. is a New York based company, founded
in November 1994. It has provided a total of approximately $970 million in nancing to a to-
tal of 31 clients. As of November 1999, the company is servicing $859 million in distribution
fee receivables (based on mark-to-market value) representing over $23 billion in underlying
mutual fund or similar assets.
5
More precisely, Constellation acts as an advisor to FEP Capital and Lightning Finance Limited, the
actual owner of the DCABS. We shall refer to these entities collectively as \Constellation" throughout.
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The growth in this business is related to the rapid growth in the entire mutual fund indus-
try, as well as to the increased relative popularity of back-load funds among the general class
of load funds (see Section 2). Constellation, for example, increased its quarterly origination
rate due to ongoing asset ow contracts with existing clients from less than $5 million in the
rst quarter of 1996 to nearly $122 million in the third quarter of 1999, amounting to an
annual growth rate of 149%. Figure 1 shows Constellation's quarterly asset origination rate
over its history.
DCABS are easily priced and hedged in theory. In practice, however, the mixture of
assets is important for risk management purposes, since some DCABS are dicult to hedge
even using traded OTC derivatives. Diversication then becomes a key component of actual
mark-to-market pricing and risk management. Moreover, diversication is also critical due
to the presence of tracking error in mutual fund performance. While for index funds, which
are typically no-load, low cost funds, the tracking error is small by design, the tracking error
in actively managed funds may be substantial.
As an example, Constellation's receivables portfolio, valued at $859 million, comprises
DCABS from nineteen domestic, three Canadian and four oshore mutual fund families
representing shares in over 450 mutual funds. Another, relatively small, portion of the
portfolio stems from insurance products such as deferred annuity investment products oered
by three insurance companies.
The levered capital structure of FEP Capital, Constellation's asset holding subsidiary,
is of interest because of the resulting importance of hedging. The company currently has
a $595 million revolving credit facility arranged by a major commercial bank. The line of
credit is used to nance existing assets and purchase new assets. The loan is secured by
a rst priority lien on these assets. FEP Capital is permitted to borrow up to 95% of the
mark-to-market value of its assets (including the hedge position).
This high leverage ratio is related to the historical performance of the hedge (see below).
The cost of the credit facility is sensitive to certain coverage tests. Currently, for example,
the parameters are such that the company pays 0.375% on undrawn balances and 1.50%
over LIBOR on outstanding balances. The company also holds and hedges equity tranches
associated with two o-balance-sheet asset backed securitization transactions (see below).
The remainder, the equity part of the company's balance sheet, is comprised of initial paid-in
capital and retained earnings.
Constellation's nal source of funding is securitization. The structure of these transac-
tions is typical to many other securitizations of dierent asset classes. For example, Con-
stellation's initial securitization transaction, which closed in May 1999, was valued at $200
15
million, using a four tranche sequential pay structure. The most senior tranche was rated
Aa2 by Moody's and other tranches had ratings between A2 to Ba2, with 89% of the notes
carrying investment grade ratings. In September 1999 a second securitization transaction of
approximately $170 million was completed with similar results.
The value of the securitized assets is inherently volatile, since the assets are not hedged.
To help provide some protection against this volatility, signicant portfolio diversication
is built in. The receivables comprise 176 funds from 8 separate families and 237 monthly
pools. The funds represent a broad range of investment styles, underlying asset classes, and
international exposures. These transactions also validated the mark-to-market valuation
approach, in that total cash proceeds approximated the mark-to-market value of the deferred
commission assets. The company retained a residual interest (the equity tranche) in the
securitization. Proceeds from securitization were used to pay down existing bank loans.
4.2 The Reality of Managing the Assets' Risk
When deferred commission assets are purchased, Constellation exposes itself to declines and
increases in the mark-to-market value of its receivables. This risk can be divided into three
parts: (1) market risk that can be attributed to changes in market-wide factors, (2) specic
risk of the underlying mutual funds' performance relative to the relevant factors, and (3)
shareholder redemption and reinvestment risk. Due to the amount of leverage, the company
attempts to hedge risk. The concern is primarily with market risk, and the attempt is to
minimize the volatility of the mark-to-market value of the asset portfolio.
Market risk is reduced in four ways: (1) through asset-type diversication (e.g., non U.S.
funds and annuities), (2) through asset-class diversication (e.g., equity, short-term xed
income and long-term xed income), (3) through the terms of the receivable contracts, and
(4) through nancial hedging using various derivative contracts. We shall focus on market-
based nancial transaction that control primarily market risk.
The hedging strategy consists of shorting futures on indices that are determined to be
most closely related to the performance of each fund. Because cash ows are aected by
fund shareholder behavior, Constellation developed models that are designed to take into
consideration predictable redemption rates, reinvestment rates and fee waiver rates over time.
The company uses an actuarial analysis of historical observations to generate shareholder
behavior predictions. The risk management desk uses futures and options in over 15 indices in
the process of hedging with the stated objective of minimizing risk subject to cost constraints.
The vast majority of day-to-day transactions are in a handful of listed indices (e.g., S&P 500,
S&P MidCap, Russell 2000, Treasury Note and Bond Futures). The company complements
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these liquid exchange-traded instruments with OTC trades in indices that can better match
the asset risks, including MSCI EAFE and Emerging Market indexes and the Lehman High
Yield Bond Index.
The procedural aspects of the risk management process are of some interest. Strategies
are developed and implemented by Constellation's risk management desk. For each potential
strategy, the risk management desk estimates the trading cost and compares it to the cost of
an implied equity allocation that would be needed for unhedged risk. If the strategy passes
this cost/benet test, the desk then implements the trades, monitors the positions, calculates
daily prots and losses and measures the success of the hedge compared to expectations. The
accounting department independently calculates the nancial impact of the mark-to-market
value of the assets each month and nets it with the hedge results. The net impact is then
compared to that reported by the risk management desk in order to provide a system of
checks and balances that ensures eective execution of the company's risk/return objectives.
4.3 Hedging Results
The stated goal of the hedging program is to reduce the annualized residual volatility of
the value of the DCABS plus the hedge positions to less than 2% of the mark-to-market
value of the portfolio. Residual volatility results predominantly from tracking error and
from some positions that are left completely unhedged. Tracking error exists due to the
presence of fund-specic risk that is not fully diversied, as well as under-/over-hedging of
known factors (see below). In addition, some funds generate exposures for which there is no
adequate alternative hedge instrument that can be acquired cost-eectively.
Figure 2 shows the hedged and unhedged monthly mark-to-market values of Constella-
tion's portfolio since the beginning of 1996. The most dramatic change in value the company
experienced, in both it's hedged and unhedged value, was during the third quarter of 1998.
The value of the hedged portfolio declined by 1.77%. The hedge position managed to limit
the impact of market movements in the third quarter of 1998 to less than two standard devi-
ations over a one-quarter horizon (which is 1%). Under standard value at risk assumptions
this is approximately the type of event that is expected to occur during one quarter in the
course of ten years. Specically, a decline in value of two standard deviations or more is the
2.5 percentile (under normality). Below we show that this impact was primarily concentrated
in non-U.S. assets.
It is interesting to look more closely at the eectiveness and economic characteristics of
the hedging program. We analyze three monthly return series: asset values, hedge portfolio
return, and the dierence of these two { the hedging error. Our rst goal is to quantify
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more precisely the quality of the hedging program. In addition, we obtain data on relevant
indexes that allow us to better understand ex post the sources of the hedging error. The
data span the period from January 1996 to April 1999, for a total of 40 monthly returns.
All calculations use simple, monthly rates of return.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the three series. The volatility of the asset and
hedge series are 3% and 2.8% per month, respectively, while that of the hedging error series
is much lower, 0.5% per month. This is consistent with the stated policy of maintaining
a quarterly standard deviation of portfolio return (assets plus hedge) of 1% per quarter.
The most striking feature is the high correlation between the asset and hedge series, -0.987.
The hedge is nearly perfect. Notice that the hedging error is positively correlated with the
asset portfolio. The correlation of 0.512 indicates that the portfolio is slightly under-hedged.
Ex post, scaling up the hedge portfolio by 7% would have minimized the error. Given the
monthly standard deviations and correlations the theoretical minimal error would have been
0.231% per month (instead of 0.512%). It is important to note, again, that these calculations
are made ex post.
To further examine the quality of the hedge, we obtain data on four potentially rele-
vant factors/indexes. We use monthly returns for the Wilshire 5000 Index, the Morgan
Stanley Capital International EAFE Index (which includes all major non-US equity markets
including Europe, Australia and the Far East), the MSCI Emerging Market Index (EMER),
and Lehman's Government Bond Index (GOV). Table 5 documents the correlations between
these \hedging instruments". As could be anticipated, the three equity indexes are highly
correlated at the monthly frequency (correlations range between 0.66 and 0.69). The bond
index is slightly negatively correlated with these three indexes.
In Table 6 we perform a hedging exercise using univariate regressions of the asset port-
folio on the hedging instruments, and, more interestingly, a hedging error analysis using
regressions of the hedging errror series on the same factors. The Wilshire index has the
highest explanatory power for the asset return series, with an R
2
of 0.89. The EAFE and
EMER factors have some explanatory power, with R
2
s of 0.55 and 0.56, respectively, while
the GOV index has no explanatory power. Given the above results on the tightness of the
hedge, it is no surprise that the same regressions for the hedge return series are close to a
mirror image of those for the asset series.
Interestingly, the regression analysis of the hedging error series reveals signicant ex-
planatory power for all four factors. That is, once most of the risk in the asset portfolio {
primarily US market risk { is taken out, the residual depends on all the candidate factors. In
terms of R
2
(and correlation, of course) the most relevant factor is the EMER factor. Con-
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stellation's portfolio includes a small number of DCABS backed by emerging market funds.
Constellation is doing little to hedge this exposure due to its small size and the diculty
and cost of hedging this risk.
In Table 7 we document the results from multiple regressions of various combinations
of the hedging instruments. Interestingly, the R
2
from a multiple regression of the asset
portfolio on the full set of four hedging instruments is only 0.923. This number may seem
surprisingly low, since the hedged portion of the total asset return risk is higher. Specically,
the hedged portion of the total risk can be calculated from the variances of the asset and
residual series in Table 4, i.e.,
R
2
= 1  V ar(R
Error
)=V ar(R
Asset
) = 1  0:517
2
=2:992
2
= 0:97:
Recall, however, that the actual hedge is implemented and adjusted continuously, which
explains the dierence. On the other hand, since the hedge is implemented ex ante, this is
further evidence of the high accuracy of the hedge using the contingent claims approach.
At the same time, as we saw in Table 4, the portfolio is slightly under-hedged, and it
is not surprising that the four hedging instruments combined have signicant explanatory
power for the hedging error. The R
2
for a multiple regression with all four instruments
is 0.417. Given the use of the Wilshire index (with an R
2
of 0.227 on its own), each of
the additional instruments help explain a signicant portion of the hedging error series. For
example, a multiple regression of the error series on the Wilshire and the GOV indexes raises
the R
2
to 0.347, with a signicantly positive beta on the Wilshire index and a signicantly
negative beta on the GOV index.
Together, these results are remarkable for a couple of reasons. First, the quality of the
hedge is surprisingly high. Second, and related, the idiosyncratic risk in the total asset
portfolio is suprisingly low. The tracking error that exists in specic funds is diversied
away, leaving close to pure market risk, which the contingent claims approach hedges very
successfully.
5 Concluding Remarks
We develop a framework for the valuation and hedging of DCABS. The formulae we obtain
value DCABS using the contingent claims approach and are expressed in terms of the risk-free
rate, the current value and volatility of assets under management, and a set of fund-specic
characteristics such as the fee schedules, the expense ratio, the dividend and capital gains
distribution rate, the reinvestment rate, and the path of expected future redemptions. We
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show that the most relevant factors are the asset value and the fee schedule. As a case study
we investigate the portfolio of fee-backed assets held by Constellation Financial Management,
a DCABS nancing company. Their success in hedging the market exposure of these assets
validates our approach.
While the discussion is specic to DCABS, the framework can be applied more generally.
Our analysis sheds light on the valuation and risks of mutual fund companies, as well as
other money management entities within the nancial services industry. For example, given
the consolidation within this industry, many nancial institutions now have large holdings of
asset management businesses. These businesses are considered "cash cows" to the extent that
they generate revenues from fee-based products. However, these revenues are really claims
on the underlying assets, i.e., on the stock or bond markets, and thus represent potentially
risky claims, irrespective of future redemptions. Therefore, the applicability of this paper's
methodology goes well beyond the pricing of the asset-backed security that we discuss.
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Fund Type Number Median Value Total Value Avg. Size Percent
of Funds ($MM) ($MM) ($MM)
ALL SHARES 10,482 41.1 3,769,537 360 100
No Load 4339 60.6 1,863,340 429 49
Equity 2883 58.3 1,439,588 499
Fixed Income 1456 65.5 398,609 274
Front Load 2940 55.4 1,383,123 470 37
Equity 1660 59.2 1,068,542 644
Fixed Income 1244 48.9 298,995 240
Deferred Load 3268 18.3 538,468 165 14
Equity 1899 22.5 389,845 205
Fixed Income 1333 13.3 132,060 99
Table 1: Mutual Fund Summary Information
The table presents a breakdown of mutual fund asset values as of December 1998 by type of
asset and fee structure.
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YEAR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Contractual ABSC Schedule
0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75%
Contractual CDSC Schedule
4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 2: Representative ABSC and CDSC Schedules
The table presents ABSC and CDSC schedules for a representative equity fund.
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V V
1
V
2
V
3
Elasticity
Base Case 4.822 3.674 1.274 -0.126 0.894
Yield +5% 4.666 3.615 1.274 -0.223 0.943
Reinvestment -10% 4.763 3.615 1.274 -0.126 0.893
Expenses -1% 4.960 3.796 1.274 -0.110 0.886
Volatility +10% 4.757 3.674 1.274 -0.191 0.894
Redemptions +10% 4.707 2.844 2.039 -0.176 0.822
Table 3: Valuation Sensitivity Analysis
The table presents the total value and value of the three components for DCABS (see equa-
tions (6)-(9)) for various sets of parameter values. Values are per $100 of AUM at origination.
All values are based on the fee schedules in Table 2. The base case parameters are
r
f
= 0:06  = 0:15 DIV = 0:02 CG = 0:03 EXP = 0:02 RE = 0:90
RD
1
= 0:05 RD
2
= 0:10 RD
3
= 0:15 RD
4
= 0:15
RD
5
= 0:15 RD
6
= 0:15 RD
7
= 0:30 RD
8
= 0:30
For all the other scenarios, all parameters are kept constant with the exception of the change
noted in the rst column. For example, \Expenses -1%" refers to the scenario in which
expenses are reduced from the base case value of 0.02 to 0.01. For the redemption scenario,
expected redemptions in all years are increased by 10%.
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Assets Hedge Error
Mean 0.576 -0.630 -0.054
STD 2.992 2.763 0.517
Max 4.545 10.732 1.028
Min -12.110 -4.205 -1.378
Correlation
Assets 1.000 -0.987 0.512
Hedge -0.987 1.000 -0.368
Error 0.512 -0.368 1.000
Table 4: Assets, Hedge Portfolio and Hedging Error Summary Statistics
The table presents basic summary statistics for the asset portfolio, the hedge portfolio, and
the hedging error, i.e., the residual return. Data are for January 1996 to April 1999, for a
total of 40 monthly returns. Statistics are for simple, monthly rates of return.
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Wilshire MSCI EAFE MSCI EMER LehGov
Wilshire 1.000 0.673 0.660 -0.016
MSCI EAFE 0.673 1.000 0.689 -0.098
MSCI EMER 0.660 0.689 1.000 -0.192
LehGov -0.016 -0.098 -0.192 1.000
Table 5: Correlations between Indexes
The table presents the correlation matrix of instruments used for the error analysis. Data
are for January 1996 to April 1999, for a total of 40 monthly returns. Statistics are for
simple, monthly rates of return.
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Assets
Correlation Beta SE R
2
Wilshire 0.942 0.498 0.029 0.887
MSCI EAFE 0.745 0.535 0.078 0.554
MSCI EMER 0.749 0.286 0.041 0.561
LehGov 0.043 0.102 0.382 0.002
Hedge Portfolio
Correlation Beta SE R
2
Wilshire -0.931 -0.454 0.029 0.867
MSCI EAFE -0.715 -0.474 0.075 0.511
MSCI EMER -0.707 -0.249 0.040 0.499
LehGov -0.113 -0.246 0.351 0.013
Hedging Error
Correlation Beta SE R
2
Wilshire 0.477 0.044 0.013 0.227
MSCI EAFE 0.487 0.060 0.018 0.237
MSCI EMER 0.559 0.037 0.009 0.313
LehGov -0.354 -0.144 0.062 0.126
Table 6: Univariate Regressions on Indexes
The table presents results from univariate regressions of the asset portfolio, hedge portfolio
and residual portfolio on four nancial indexes. Data are for January 1996 to April 1999,
for a total of 40 monthly returns. Statistics are for simple, monthly rates of return.
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Wilshire EAFE EMER LehGov R
2
Assets 0.394 (0.035) 0.090 (0.050) 0.066 (0.026) 0.923
Hedge -0.381(0.040) -0.073 (0.056) -0.041 (0.029) 0.887
Error 0.013 (0.018) 0.017 (0.025) 0.025 (0.013) 0.342
Assets 0.498 (0.029) 0.138 (0.128) 0.891
Hedge -0.455(0.027) -0.279 (0.122) 0.883
Error 0.043 (0.012) -0.141 (0.054) 0.347
Assets 0.382 (0.034) 0.091 (0.047) 0.078 (0.025) 0.252 (0.105) 0.934
Hedge -0.364 (0.036) -0.075 (0.050) -0.059 (0.027) -0.367 (0.111) 0.914
Error 0.018 (0.017) 0.016 (0.024) 0.019 (0.013) -0.115 (0.054) 0.417
Table 7: Multiple Regressions on Indexes
The table presents a multiple regression analysis of the asset portfolio, hedge portfolio and
residual portfolio on four nancial indexes. Standard errors are in parentheses. Data are
for January 1996 to April 1999, for a total of 40 monthly returns. Statistics are for simple,
monthly rates of return.
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Figure 1: Historical Quarterly Originations
Constellation's orgination of fee-backed assets (in $millions) on a quarterly basis for the
period 1995Q1 to 1999Q3.
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Figure 2: Hedged vs. Unhedged Performance
Unhedged and hedged monthly returns on Constellation's portfolio of fee-backed assets
(using marked-to-market valuations) and returns on the S&P500 for the period January
1996 to April 1999.
